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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
ments have been held privileged.'5 Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States,'6
relied on by this court, reaffirmed the general rule that all material admis-
sable as evidence, obtained by the Government through solicitation or
volunteered by third persons, is subject to subpoena, but the court should
be "solicitous to protect against disclosures of the identities of the inform-
ants.'' 7
Defendants contend that such confidential informants "promise to
become something more than mere informers." 1 They have testified before
the grand jury and will probably be called as witnesses at the trial. The
Government may finally elect not to use a given document rather than re-
veal the identity of an informant.' Writings not used at the trial but
which have been presented to the grand jury arc also protected from dis-
closure by a strong policy favoring secrecy of grand jury proceedings.20  Fur-
thermore, the denial of pre-trial inspection does not preclude further discov-
ery during the trial.
2'
Only persons charged with treason or other capital offenses can demand
as a matter of right a list of witnesses prior to the trial.22  The court can
take appropriate measures 31 to protect the rights of the defense in event of
undue surprise during the course of the trial. Defendants' discovery of re-
ports revealing the identity of informants would have afforded them a list
of the Government's witnesses. This list is not essential to the defense,
but would enable the Communist Party to police its ranks. The court
recognized this, and prevented the circumvention of an established principle
of law, by defendants' use of a procedural rule.
CRIMINAL LAW - TRIAL - INSTRUCTION AS TO THE
POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE AS REVERSIBLE ERROR
The jury requested the court to advise them as to the probability of
the defendant serving a full life sentence without parole, if they returned a
15. United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.I. 523 (Minn. 1949); United States v.
Kohler, 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
16. 341 U.S. 214 (1951).
17. Ibid at 221.
18. Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947); Wilson v. United
States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932).
19. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638-639 (2d Cir. 1950); United States
v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d
503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944).
20. Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939); Metzler v. United
States, 64 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1933); United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp.,
55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931).
21. Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 1949); United States v.
Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1944), '
22. 62 STAT. 831 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (Supp. 1951).
23. Rubio v. United States, 22 F.2d 766, 768 (9th Cir. 1927), cert. denied 276 U.S.
619 (1928) (The court had power to grant a continuance or a new trial upon a proper
showing that the defendant's rights were not safeguarded because of surprise).
CASES NOTED
verdict with recommendation of mercy.1 The court informed them that
the parole board could release a person under a life sentence after seven
years of imprisonment. A guilty verdict without recommendation was re-
turned and defendant was sentenced to death. Held, reversed. The in-
struction was prejudicial and operated to influence the jury against a recom-
mendation of mercy. Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65, 70 S.E.2d 710 (1952).
There is a decided judicial conflict 2 as to whether an instruction to the
jury on the function of the parole board constitutes reversible error. Some
courts refuse to upset the verdict, holding, that while such charge constitutes
error and should not have been given, it is not sufficient for a reversal?3
Others take the position that the jury should be so informed. 4 In passing
upon the point some weight is evidently given where the statement tb the
jury is in response to an inquiry, rather than when volunteered by the
court.5 Those courts" holding that it is prejudicial error warranting a re-
versal, take the position that the jury should not be instructed as to the
consequence of a verdict;7 that it is highly improper for them to be advised
that some other arm of the state may reduce the sentence,8 and that the
court should refuse to answer a request as to the question of parole. 9
Ironically, the majority of courts permit the prosecutor to mention
parole law in addressing the jury. 10 His remarks, although often inflamma-
tory," are not considered grounds for reversal. The courts appear to be in
1. CA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Temp. Stipp. 1951) ("Whenever a jury, in a capital
case of homicide, shall find a verdict of guilty, with a recommendation of mercy,
such verdict shall be held to mean imprisonment for life.")
2. Accord: Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 834 (1949); Sukle v. People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P.2d 233 (1941); Houston v.
Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 125, 109 S.W.2d 45 (1937); ef. State v. Tennant, 204 Iowa
130, 214 N.W. 708 (1927); Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639, 178 S.E. 797
(1935). Contra: State v. Barth, 114 N.J.L. 112, 176 At]. 183 (1935); State v. Car-
rol, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542 (1937); cf. People v. Sukdol, 322 Ill. 540, 153 N.E. 727
(1926); Liska v. State, 115 Ohio 283, 152 N.E. 667 (1926); Massa v. State, 37 Ohio
App. 532, 175 N.E. 219 (1930).
3. People v. Sukdol, 322 11. 540, 153 N.E. 727 (1926); State v. Carrol, 52 Wyo.
29, 69 P.2d 542 (1937).
4. State v. Carrigan, 93 N.J.L. 268, 108 Atl. 315 (1919); State v. Rombolo, 89
N.J.L. 565, 99 AtI. 434 (1916).
5. Jones v. State, 161 Ark. 242, 255 S.W. 876 (1923); Freeman v. State, 156 Ark.
592, 247 S.W. 51 (1923).
6. See note 2 supra.
7. State v. Tennant, 204 Iowa 130, 214 N.W. 708 (1927).
8. Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639, 178 S.E. 797 (1935).
9. Polly v. People, 107 Colo. 6, 108 P.2d 220 (1940); Zell v. State, 189 Ind. 433,
127 N.E. 1 (1920); Gains v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 237, 46 S.W.2d 75 (1932).
10. Sullivan v. State, 55 P.2d 312 (Ariz. 1936); WVechter v. People, 53 Colo. 89,
124 Pac. 183 (1912); People v. Murphy, 276 Ill. 304, 114 N.E. 609 (1916); State v.
Junkins, 147 Iowa 588, 126 N.W. 689 (1910); Glenday v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 313,
74 S.W.2d 332 (1934). Contra: State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139 (1922);
Dingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 149 S.E. 414 (1929).
11. People v. Murphy, 276 Ii. 304, 114 N.E. 609, 616 (1916) ("there is a parole
law which turns them out as fast as it gets them there").
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accord that, while the verdict will not be upset, the remarks are improper
and should be excluded from the trial record.
12
The three justices dissenting in the instant case' 3 pointed out that the
jury has a right to recommend, or decline to recommend, mercy with or
without any reason, and is entitled to know whether a life sentence really
means that the defendant will serve for life. An earlier case,' 4 in which the
same circumstances were before the court, resulted in the conviction being
upheld. The majority opinion cites this case as being not contrary to the
decision here. They do not, however, attempt to distinguish the two, and
a distinction is not apparent. A long line of Georgia decisions'5 has upheld
convictions in cases where the solicitor general has remarked to the jury con-
cerning the parole law. Some of the remarks have been highly prejudicial."
This was probably' 7 the first direct holding in Georgia that it constitutes
reversible error for the court to instruct the jury on the function of the
parole board.
It is submitted that this is one of the elements to be considered by the
jury. "'8 When the court so informs them, it is merely charging the law.'9
All the cases in which this question is presented involve heinous crimes. It
is evident that the jury, while willing to extend mercy and thus prevent
capital punishment, desire assurance that the defendant will not be turned
loose upon society. This is a meritorious consideration in determining, once
guilt has been established, whether a recommendation should be made.
INSURANCE-RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN SUIT
TO ENFORCE POLICY
Plaintiff beneficiary, having successfully sued the defendant for dis-
ability benefits on a foreign life insurance policy, claimed reasonable attor-
12. \Vechter v. People, 53 Colo. 89, 124 Pac. 183 (1912); State v. Junkins, 147
Iowa 588, 126 N.W. 689 (1910).
13. Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65, 70 S.E.2d 710 (1952).
14. McRae v. State, 181 Ga. 68, 181 S.E. 571 (1935).
15. McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 52 S.E.2d 294 (1949); Hyde v. State, 196 Ga.
475, 26 S.E.2d 744 (1943); Thorton v. State, 190 Ga. 783, 10 S.E.2d 746 (1940);
Sloan v. State, 183 Ca. 108, 187 S.E. 670 (1936); White v. State, 177 Ga. 115, 169
S.E. 499 (1933); Manchester v. State, 171 Ga. 121, 155 S.E. 11 (1930); Lucas v. State
146 Ga. 315, 91 SE. 72 (1916).
16. McLendon v. State, 205 Ca. 55, 52 S.E.2d 294, 299 (1949) ("If you give the
defendant a life sentence, his lawyers and some politicians will get him out of jail, and
have him walking the streets in a few years"); White v. State, 177 Ga. 115, 169 S.E.
499, 504 (1933) (" , . . it means that after three years this defendant has a right to
ask for a parole by going over with a sob sister from the interracial commission.").
17. But see Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416, 47 S.E.2d 54 (1948) (Trial judge
answered jury that the parole law is changed so often, he didn't know what it was at the
moment. In reversing, the court said in effect that the jury was instructed that next
week, next month or n~ext year defendant might be released).
18. State v. Carrigan, 93 N.I.L. 268, 108 Aft. 315 (1919).
19. Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65, 70 S.E.2d 710, 712 (1952) (dissenting opinion);
Massa v. State, 37 Ohio App. 532, 175 N.E. 219 (1930).
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